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Polio in north India: What Next? 
Patricia Jeffery & Roger Jeffery 
(Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh, UK) 
Abstract 
India has continued to report cases of wild poliovirus [WPV] and acute flaccid paralysis 
[AFP] throughout the 2000s. Indeed, in 2009 the numbers of both exceeded the totals for 
2008, by 26% and 9.5% respectively. Confirmed WPV cases are increasingly concentrated 
amongst Muslim children and localised in western UP and Bihar. The Pulse Polio Initiative 
has responded by pressurising parents into complying with the administration of multiple 
doses of polio vaccine to their children. But almost all new WPV cases occur among children 
who have been vaccinated – often, many times.  The problems inhere in the weaknesses of 
government health services and in the PPI’s own inadequacies and errors: a focused top-down 
programme using the wrong vaccine and with dubious targets. The PPI has lost its way and 
requires a radical shake-up.  
Contact: Patricia Jeffery, pjeffery@staffmail.ed.ac.uk 
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Introduction 
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 1988, but India’s Pulse Polio 
Initiative began in earnest only in 1995. Since then, Supplementary Immunisation Activities 
(nationally and regionally coordinated immunisation rounds plus ‘mop-up’ rounds to deal 
with polio outbreaks) have repeatedly mobilised health sector employees, teachers and 
volunteers to administer oral polio vaccine at booths as well as through house-to-house visits. 
The aim had been to eradicate polio by 2000 and certify India polio-free by 2005. Yet India 
continues to report wild poliovirus [WPV] cases, as well as cases of acute flaccid paralysis 
[AFP] that have not been proven to be caused by wild poliovirus. The PPI’s operational 
approach can no longer be sustained: on technical as well as socio-political grounds, 
fundamental flaws require a root-and-branch reconsideration of the whole approach.  
Table 1 shows the reported cases of WPV in India since 1998. But WPV cases are only just 
over 1% of the reported AFP cases: Table 2 shows AFP cases in 2008 and 2009 by major 
contributory States. Across the country reported incidence is rising, in some cases very 
rapidly. Since 2000, however, confirmed WPV cases have been increasingly clustered in 
western UP and parts of Bihar, and Pulse Polio activities have largely focused on these ‘hot 
spots’, with more frequent immunisation rounds and extensive mapping procedures to 
monitor coverage. Map 1 shows that WPV cases nationally are now concentrated – even more 
in 2009 than in 2008 – with 24 UP districts contributing over 80 per cent of the national total.  
But why has the PPI failed to turn the apparent successes of the period 2003-05 into complete 
eradication or at least a continuing decline; and what role has its ‘Underserved Strategy’ 
played in that failure? 
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Pulse Polio Initiative and its critics 
During the 2000s, the optimism expressed in WHO Weekly Epidemiological Reports 
fluctuated in response to the halting progress and reverses of the polio campaign in India, but 
the reports contain little serious questioning of the programme’s basic parameters. 
Initially, the programme continued to use tOPV, but there was a shift to monovalent P1 
vaccine (mOPV1) in 2005. By 2007, there were Pulse Polio rounds every month in UP and 
Bihar. In 2009, polio cases continued to occur, but predominantly P3 rather than P1. WHO 
has recommended adjustments to the combinations of oral vaccines as well as possibly using 
new mOPV1 with a higher vaccine titre and supplementing oral vaccines with inactivated 
poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in future (see WHO, 2009b).   
Some critics of Pulse Polio focus on the choice of oral (OPV) rather than inactivated vaccine 
(IPV). IPV is more costly (per unit dose) and requires injection technology and trained staff.  
But critics argue that polio cannot be effectively eradicated using OPV, especially among 
immuno-compromised children who might require numerous – perhaps excessive – doses 
before attaining immunity (Sathyamala et al., 2005: 377). In 2007-2008, for instance, 77 per 
cent of confirmed polio cases had had more than 7 doses of OPV and 18 per cent had had 4-7 
doses—which suggests that poor coverage is an inadequate explanation for programme failure 
(WHO, 2009b: 284). Moreover, oral vaccine itself can cause polio, and immuno-
compromised children may excrete the virus, which can circulate ‘silently’ and be ingested by 
other children, some of whom may become immune whilst others may develop paralytic 
polio. The silent circulation of poliovirus also means that the successful interruption of its 
transmission is hard to ascertain.  
Nevertheless, the official view is that the interruption of poliovirus transmission is imminent 
provided efforts are redoubled in the endemic areas.  Confirmed polio cases are attributed to 
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failures of coverage and the ‘suboptimal efficacy of OPV’: the way forward is via a strategy 
of increasingly frequent immunisation rounds (see e.g. WHO, 2009a). So in the 29 months 
between January 2007 and May 2009, the high risk districts of western UP experienced about 
20 rounds of mOPV1, 5 rounds of mOPV3 and one round of tOPV (WHO, 2009b: Fig.1). 
Yet, as Map 1 and Table 1 demonstrate, these rounds have failed to stop a rise in the number 
of WPV cases. And increasingly obvious, while attention is paid to WPV, cases of AFP 
continue to rise, (from 9.4 per 100,000 children aged under 15 in 2007 to 10.2 in 2008 and 
11.2 in 2009) with no apparent strategy to respond to the concerns these cases generate.  
The ‘Underserved Strategy’ and Muslims in western UP 
Several districts in western UP contain Muslim majority towns and sizeable numbers of rural 
Muslims. Such is the situation in the remaining polio hot spots: JP Nagar, Moradabad, 
Rampur, Bareilly and Badaun. Furthermore, since the early 2000s confirmed cases of polio in 
India have been increasingly and disproportionately amongst Muslim children: by 2007 
Muslim children accounted for 94 per cent of confirmed cases (Chaturvedi, 2008: 146 & 271).  
The preferred explanation for this pattern is that Muslim children are less likely than others to 
receive the polio drops. From 2003, a high-profile public awareness campaign—the 
‘Underserved Strategy,’ deploying celebrities, community leaders and local volunteers—has 
been directed particularly at Muslims in the polio hot spots.  Muslims in western UP were 
known to be alienated from BJP governments at the state and national levels until 2004, but 
prominent Islamic institutions gave their support and madrasahs hosted Pulse Polio teams 
(Chaturvedi, 2008).  
At the beginning of the 2000s it was plausible that confirmed polio cases were amongst 
Muslim children who had been consistently missed out during both routine immunisation and 
Pulse Polio rounds. By 2006, however, this explanation was becoming tired and increasingly 
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de-linked from the reality that Muslims were ‘co-operating’, whether out of voluntary belief 
and understanding (as Chaturvedi, 2008 would have it) or through coercion. Military 
campaign imagery suggests that the latter was almost inevitable: in 2001 a Social 
Mobilisation Network (SMNet) had been established in the UP hot spots and worked ‘like an 
army faced with a critical war situation where troops are deployed, mobilised and constantly 
trained to face any eventuality’ (Chaturvedi, 2008: 139).  
Our own research in Bijnor – one of the districts at the sharp end of this attention – suggests 
that Pulse Polio’s modus operandi—in practice even if not in intention—has lost so much 
goodwill amongst Muslims in western UP that it might be difficult to reorient it and make up 
lost ground. Pulse Polio entails intensive surveillance, energetic persuasion and sometimes 
coercion.  Yet Muslim and Hindu villagers alike complain that the inadequacies of 
Government health services in general are further undermined by the PPI itself (Jeffery & 
Jeffery, 2010). Reorientation is essential, not only to help reduce polio and other forms of 
childhood paralysis (which tend to be ignored in the rush to eliminate wild polio) but also to 
reduce the negative impacts that PPI is having on all other activities of the UP government 
health staff. 
Health Care Provision and ‘Vertical Programmes’ 
The situation of Muslims in north India is crucial to understanding their tendency to be at best 
tentative towards the PPI. As the Sachar Report details, Muslims are disproportionately 
concentrated in the most economically and socially marginal sectors of north Indian society—
precisely those sectors with the poor housing and sanitation in which infectious diseases 
flourish. Opposition to Pulse Polio is ‘highly complex and cannot be explained by religious 
affiliation alone’ (since Hindus and others have also resisted) and it has been most 
conspicuous in areas that have been poorly served by government development programmes 
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(Bhattacharya & Dasgupta, 2009: 1182).   
Complaints about the poor quality of government health services and about staff apathy, 
corruption and caste and religious discrimination are widespread in western UP, as are 
demands for improvement and the prioritisation of health issues other than polio. And 
villagers are not alone in questioning the wisdom of focusing so much money and staff effort 
to deal with a single health issue, when general health services leave so much to be desired.  
Routine immunisation may have been weakened by the focus on polio and some vaccine-
preventable diseases (e.g. diphtheria) have re-emerged and primary and public health 
activities have been disrupted (Bhattacharya & Dasgupta, 2009: 1181-1182). In recent public 
health budgetary allocations, 74 per cent of the total immunisation budget has been devoted to 
Pulse Polio, and allocations to TB, malaria, and diarrhoeal diseases have been much lower 
than allocations to Pulse Polio (Duggal, 2009). According to the NFHS, in 2005-2006, fewer 
than 23 per cent of children in UP had ‘full immunisation’ (complete courses for TB, DPT, 
measles and polio) (though coverage for polio was around 88 per cent) and parents reported 
acute respiratory infections, fevers and diarrhoea among their young children. With infant and 
under-5 mortality rates at 73 and 96 per 1000 live births respectively in UP and about 5 
million births annually, around 360,000 infants each year die before their first birthday and 
another 100,000 before their fifth birthday—compared with a maximum of 1200 confirmed 
polio cases nationally in the 2000s.  
Vertical programmes in India have a long history of evoking a range of responses from their 
target populations, with some people seemingly willingly accepting what is being pressed 
upon them but others offering resistance. Sometimes resistance that has been met with 
coercion, which becomes normalised and feeds into other campaigns. For instance, the family 
planning programme’s single-mindedness and coercive practices, particularly against the poor 
and religious minorities in northern India, have left a lasting legacy that colours how Muslims 
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in particular respond to government health initiatives (Jeffery & Jeffery, 2010).  Bhattacharya 
& Dasgupta argue that ‘[a]ll immunisation campaigns are deeply social and political 
phenomena’, not simply medical ones, and the problems associated with the polio programme 
cannot simply be resolved by technical means or the infusion of more cash (2009: 1177 & 
1183). They also note that polio programme field workers in western UP have been under 
great pressure  during the 2000s and that ‘outbreaks of wild poliovirus had brought on the 
threat or imposition of penalties from the top, all of which was leading to demoralization and 
discontent among personnel of all ranks’, whilst hostility and nervousness were generated 
among civilians when ‘polio vaccination was carried out forcibly by health administrators, 
with the support of the local police’ (Bhattacharya & Dasgupta, 2009: 1181-1182). This is 
clearly unsustainable and unjustifiable in light of the continuing cases among those who have 
taken the drops, often many times.  
Conclusion 
Resistance to Pulse Polio has been characterised as a particularly Muslim phenomenon and 
Muslims have been the focus of the continuing immunisation activities. Rather than re-
examining the programme’s widely-criticised systemic limitations, the official response has 
been more energetic efforts to persuade doubting and resisting civilians to comply with ever 
more frequent and intensively-monitored immunisation rounds. An ‘Independent evaluation 
of major barriers to interrupting poliovirus transmission’ in October 2009 concluded 
(somewhat confusingly, given the evidence of rising rates cited above) that   
the high coverage observed in both UP and Bihar reflected the most thorough, well 
managed vaccination effort that team members had ever seen. In short, programme 
implementation was not viewed as a constraint to elimination of polio (Mohamed et al., 
2009: 7) 
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The Underserved Strategy is a tacit acknowledgement that Muslims have fared particularly 
badly in regard to government public health services and that their children are more liable 
than others to succumb to an array of poverty-related ailments, aside from polio itself. Yet 
little has been undertaken to remedy the appalling state of government health services in 
western UP or deal with other aspects of the public health situation (affecting not only 
Muslims, of course). Some idea of the irrationalities to be found in vertical disease control 
programmes emerge – despite the authors’ best intentions, one guesses – from the recent 
review, which blames  
indiscriminate defecation, contaminated water supplies, and extreme crowding of 
population  … Add to this an extremely high prevalence of malnutrition, unclean 
supplementary food and extremely high birth rate with interbirth intervals as close as 
one year, and the vulnerability of the very young to polio and other enterovirus infection 
becomes very apparent (Mohamed et al., 2009: 7) 
This (along with blaming the local population for being ‘mobile’ ) is a picture that is very 
lopsided, when applied to western UP: generalisations from the Kosi valley seem to have 
been liberally applied to UP as well. Rather than suggest ways of overcoming the 
marginalisation produced by poor general health services and major health threats, however, 
the Polio-wallahs just reiterate the chimera of complete eradication (after which we can all, 
presumably, go home and relax – except for those suffering from non-polio AFP and all the 
other gastro-enteric and other diseases to which children in these areas are subject).  
It is worth reiterating: Children in the hot spots have received numerous doses (perhaps 
overdoses?) of oral polio vaccine. Cases are rising. And most of those identified with wild 
polio are Muslims who have had many doses of vaccine. More of the same will not solve the 
problem. Meanwhile, other diseases are allowed to gain more footholds because EPI is so 
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inadequate – and even the review team have to admit the plausibility of the link to the Pulse 
Polio Programme (Mohamed et al., 2009).  
What needs to be done is to recognise that polio cannot be eradicated, and that planning must 
move towards a routine immunisation programme that covers all children against all 
communicable and preventable diseases. This requires a reallocation of resources away from 
the high profile but ultimately barren Pulse Polio Initiative into revitalising the public health 
services of UP and Bihar. More money is not going to solve the problems they face, but more 
money will certainly help, as will more of the time of health workers, once they are released 
from monthly Pulse Polio activities and military-style campaigns that are out of place in 








Map 1: Wild Polio Cases, Uttar Pradesh, 2009: P1: 34 cases in 17 districts P3: 553 cases in 25 
districts (one case reported to be a mixture of P1 and P3) 
Source: http://www.npspindia.org/bulletin.pdf, last accessed 19 January 2010 
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Table 1: Reported Wild Polio Cases by Year,  India, 1998-2009 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
All 1934 1126 265 268 1600 225 134 66 676 874 559 724 
Source: AFP Surveillance Bulletin – India, January 2010, http://www.npspindia.org/bulletin.pdf, 
last accessed 19 January 2010 
 
Table 2: Acute Flaccid Paralysis Cases reported by year and state, 2008-09 
 2008 2009 Percentage 
increase 
Bihar 11,659 13,384 14.8% 
Jharkhand 1,532 1,480 -3.4% 
Madhya Pradesh 2,284 2,719 19.0% 
Maharashtra 1,915 2,227 16.3% 
Orissa 1,227 1,466 19.5% 
Rajasthan 1,353 1,429 5.6% 
Uttar Pradesh 17,649 18,550 5.1% 
All other states 7,966 8,644 8.5% 
All-India 45,585 49,899 9.5% 
Source: AFP Surveillance Bulletin – India, January 2010, http://www.npspindia.org/bulletin.pdf, 
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